The Macroscope.









November 2025






Global economy
US tariffs: much ado about nothing... for now!



The US tariffs increases occurred in a highly globalized world with complex supply chains...

Trade globalization

(average of world exports and imports of goods and services as a % of GDP)






... and large international capital flows

Global capital flows


(half-sum of the absolute values of net acquisition of assets and of the absolute values of net increase in liabilities, % of world GDP)



(*) Half-sum of the absolute values of current account balances













While significant, the increase in the average US tariffs rate is lower than feared a couple of months ago...






... as the US Administration has struck deals, granted many exemptions and de-escalated with China

US theoretical and observed tariffs rates $\binom{\%}{}$



Tariffed share of goods imports (dutiable value in % of custom value)







With most countries having refrained to retaliate, activity at the world level has been resilient


IMF GDP growth forecasts


(% annual rate, October 2025)
















China A trade truce amidst growing rivalry




While GDP growth was still solid in Q3, deflation is well alive












China is still suffering from a saving glut


Household saving rate (%, urban households) 40 38 36 34 32 30 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Unemployment rate





Consumer confidence





Business investment has recently weakened...

Contribution to real GDP growth (% year on year)

GDP

8

6


Investment

-2

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25


Fixed asset investment by industry

(% year on year growth of investment cumulated since the start of the calendar year, January 2023 – October 2025)



Investment share by sector





The launch of several mega-projects – notably **the mega-dam project, the construction of railway connecting Xinjiang and Tibet...** – could boost infrastructure investment and support GDP by 0.2-0.3% over the coming year.



Having learned to escalate and retaliate, China has – at least temporarily – won the trade war, keeping relatively easy access to restricted technology

China's exports to... (\$ billion, 3-month moving average) 60 ASEAN* 50 United States

(*) Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Brunei, Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia

Rare earth elements supply (thousands of tons) 80 Other Myanmar Other **United States** 60 Myanmar **Australia** 40 China (92%) 30 China (63%) 10 Mining Refining

The trade truce was extended for one year in the Kuala Lumpur agreement

Fentanyl tariff: The US will remove the 10% fentanyl tariff. Based on previous tit-for-tat measures, China is likely to remove the 10-15% retaliatory tariff on US farm goods.

Reciprocal tariff: The 90-day pause on 24% (out of 34%) reciprocal tariff will be extended by one year.


Export controls: The US will suspend the implementation of its "50% affiliate rule" for one year*. In return, China will suspend the implementation of related export controls announced on October 9 for one year.

(*) By applying the Affiliates Rule, more than 20,000 Chinese subsidiaries and indirectly owned entities (as against 1,300 today) would have fallen under the same export control restrictions as their listed parent companies.



While the increase in tariffs for China is not way above its Asian competitors, net exports contribution is likely to continue to decrease

Increase in US tariffs 40 10 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines China . Yoles





Contribution to real GDP growth (% year on year)





... in order to maintain GDP growth close to their target







3 United States A tale of two economies...





D. Trump has delivered on its agenda

Higher tariffs

No tax on tips...


"One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (\$ billion, over 2025-34)






Deport undocumented immigrants

Southwest land border encounters between ports of entry




20 21 22 23 24 25



19


Private domestic demand has remained resilient in H1 2025

Private domestic demand (% quarter on quarter, annual rate)



Contribution to private domestic demand growth

(%, annual rate, ex inventories)






The current juxtaposition of strong investment spending and weak hiring is rather unusual

Business investment and employment

(% change over 2 quarters, annual rate)








Job creations have softened, and the unemployment rate is creeping up

Job creations

(thousands, monthly rate)








Households will bear the brunt of the cost of tariffs (I)

Import prices* (December 2024 = 100) All countries



(*) Tariffs are excluded from import prices.

Wholesale and retail trade margins**





(**) Producer price index for the trade sector is calculated as selling price less acquisition price of products.

Prices of import sensitive goods

(CPI, ex food and energy)




Import price sensitive goods have added 0.5% to annualized inflation over the past 3 months.



Lower and middle-income households are facing mounting financial strains

Effects of Trump's policy on income, by income decile in 2026




Sources: JCT, LSEG Datastream, Recovery Database Network, Candriam



Black or African American unemployment rate



Number of auto repossession assignments (in millions, annual rate)





Higher-income households are however benefiting from solid wage growth and asset price appreciation

Household financial assets by income quintile


Money market fund shares


Corporate equities and mutual fund shares

_ife insurance reserves


Debt securities

(\$ trillion, 2025 Q2)





Household holdings of deposits and money market funds shares (\$ billion)



Sources: Federal Reserve, Candriam

Deposits


Loans (Assets)


Pension entitlements

Miscellaneous assets

Equity in noncorporate business

We continue to expect growth to slow, but a recession should be avoided









The task of the Fed is far from easy

Data quality




Speed limit






Real GDP per employee



Political pressure?

Fed funds rate and expectations







A "yield curve control regime" could help bring down the public debt ratio... but the episode of the 1940s reminds us that the vanishing government deficit contributed significantly!


Yield Curve Control: 1942 to 1951

Federal government debt





Federal government balance







White House economic and fiscal projections are far more optimistic than any credible estimate!

Tax cuts rarely pay for themselves!

Federal government balance in 4 episodes of tax cuts



Simulated federal debt trajectories (% of GDP)




Sources: CBO, Council of Economic Advisers, Candriam




Moreover, in the 1940s, the debt was largely held domestically!

Foreign share of total debt securities outstanding since 1945





Financing of the US current account deficit and dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves



Interest rate differential and euro dollar exchange rate









Euro area Between the United States and China...



In H1 2025, GDP grew moderately in the euro area and remained well below its pre-covid trend in Germany

Real GDP (compared to 2004-2019 trend, 2019 Q4 = 100)







Sources: LSEG Datastream, Candriam

Domestic demand has barely accelerated... except in Spain

Euro area ex Ireland GDP components

(2019 Q1 = 100, volume)






Domestic demand (ex inventories and government consumption, 2019 Q1 = 100) 106 Euro area ex Ireland 103 100 97 94 91 19 25 115 Spain 110 Italy 105 France Germany 95 90 23 24 25

PMI indices stabilized in manufacturing... and improved in services...


Manufacturing PMIs





Services PMIs








Spain

France


Still, business investment has little reasons to gain momentum (I)







Equipment and IPP* investment versus perceived demand in the euro area**




(*) Investment in intellectual property products

(**) Germany, France, Italy and Spain



... pointing to some recovery in residential investment

Mortgage interest rates (%, new business)




Loans for house purchase in the euro area




Total loans to households

(% year on year, adjusted for securitization)



Euro area residential investment









Household confidence remains subpar

Consumer confidence in the euro area







— Financial situation*

Major purchases at present

General economic situation*

— Unemployment*


(*) Next 12 months



The saving rate has barely declined

Saving rate (% of disposable income)

















Sources: LSEG Datastream, Candriam

Job creations have continued to slow



(*) Last data: 2025 Q2

Employment and firms' expectations (EC survey)






... and negotiated wages point to further slowdown ahead


Negotiated wages

(% year on year)















Despite a deal, the rise in US tariffs will weigh on activity

Tariff rate on US imports from EU (%)




Effects on euro area GDP of a 15% increase in US tariffs on European products






On the external front, headwinds are intensifying

Exports of goods and orders




Export orders (EC survey, Z-scores) France Spain Italy -1 -3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Export market shares index



Competitive position





Europe – Germany in particular – suffers from Chinese competition, notably on the European internal market


China and Germany share in euro area imports by product

(% of euro area ex Germany imports)

China share in euro area exports and imports








The Recovery and Resilience Facility will however provide some offset in 2026 as governments speed up implementation


Recovery and Resilience Facility (% of country's GDP)





The EU council is likely to allow a short extension of the program to let countries deploy the full potential of the Recovery Plan.


Government investment and capital transfers


(% of country's GDP)















All in all, except in Germany, fiscal policy is unlikely to be very supportive

Fiscal impulse in 2026







Euro area's fiscal impulse (% of GDP) 1,6 1,2 0,8 0,4 0,0 -0,4 -0,8 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26



After a slowdown, growth is set to pick up in 2026








The ECB has normalized its monetary policy

ECB interest rate expectations




10-year German sovereign rate and short-term rate expectations





Memo. ECB balance sheet





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